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The South African Law Commission recently rejected the proposal that pre-
recorded videotaped evidence of child witnesses be used in the trial process as 
a way of protecting the child from further trauma and assisting the court in its 
truth seeking function. This article examines whether the Law Commission’s 
position is well founded. It analyses the problems attendant on the present 
system with regard to child witnesses, arising chiefl y from its adherence to the 
adversarial system and the focus on aggressive cross-examination of the child 
witness, and suggests videotaped evidence as a possible solution. The main 
potential barriers to implementing such a procedure, namely the traditions 
of orality and the rules against hearsay, as well as the Constitutional argument 
regarding the right to a fair trial, are examined. It is concluded that such issues 
could be successfully overcome, provided the necessary safeguards are in place 
in order to protect the rights of the accused. The only real problem attendant 
on this procedure seems to be one of implementation and lack of resources. 
However, it is questioned whether this is a suffi ciently strong argument against 
allowing a procedure that could potentially hold such signifi cant benefi ts.
Introduction
According to s 28 of the Constitution,1 ‘a child’s best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child’.2 Furthermore, 
it provides that a child is ‘to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse 
or degradation’.3 These provisions refl ect society’s belief that children are 
vulnerable and in need of protection and also emphasise the importance 
with which they are regarded. 
However, in spite of this, it seems that this sentiment is often neglected 
in cases where a child comes into contact with the criminal justice 
system, especially in cases where his/her rights confl ict with those of an 
accused. In the present system, where the adversarial procedural model 
rules supreme and ideas of due process and the rights of the accused are 
prioritised, the rights of the child are often neglected. 
As long ago as 1925 a British departmental committee reached the 
conclusion that the existing criminal procedure and rules of evidence, 
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with particular regard to child witnesses, made it exceedingly diffi cult to 
obtain a conviction against child abusers.4 It seems that not much has 
changed over the years and the experience seems to be the same in South 
Africa today.  As a result of problems regarding the rules of evidence, guilty 
child abusers are often not convicted and are free to possibly commit 
further crimes against children.5
In 1989, the South African Law Commission (as it then was called) 
concluded that the normal adversarial trial procedure, with its strong 
emphasis on cross-examination, was insensitive and unfair to child 
witnesses.6 Recently the legislature has gone some way towards dealing with 
the problem by making provision for use in certain cases of mechanisms 
such as closed circuit television links, one-way screens and intermediaries. 
It is questioned whether these procedures go far enough in protecting 
the child witness from further trauma and assisting the court in its truth 
seeking function.7 In addressing the inadequacies of the system in light 
of past reforms, the South African Law Commission (hereafter referred to 
as the ‘SALC’) examined a number of possible proposals, including that 
of pre-recorded videotaped evidence of child witnesses. Interestingly, the 
SALC recently rejected the proposal that videotaped interviews of the 
child be used in the trial process. This article examines whether the Law 
Commission’s position is well founded. 
The law as it stands
Underpinning the law of evidence in South Africa is the principle of 
orality. Generally, evidence for either party must be given orally by the 
witnesses in the presence of the parties.8 The rationale for this is based 
on the fact that we think that the adversarial system is the best way to 
get at the truth. It is believed that parties should have an opportunity 
to confront the witnesses who testify against them, and should be 
able to challenge the evidence by questioning.9 However, there are 
certain exceptions to the rule that evidence must be given orally.10 
4 South African Law Commission Working Paper 28 (Project 71) ‘Protection of the Child 
Witness’ (1989) at 9.
5 Op cit (n 4) at 10.
6 PJ Schwikkard,  A Skeen and SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (1997) 244.
7 PJ Schwikkard ‘The abused child: A few rules of evidence considered’ 1996 Acta Juridica 
148 at 156.  See also JR Spencer ‘Child witnesses, video technology and the law of evidence’ 
1987 Crim LR 76; J McEwan ‘Child evidence: More proposals for reform’ 1988 Crim LR 813; 
PJ Schwikkard ‘The child witness: Assessment of a practical proposal’ (1991) 4 SACJ 44.
8 Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
9 Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe op cit (n6) 232.
10 See for example s 53 of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944, s 32 of the Supreme Court 
Act 59 of 1959, ss 171 and 214 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act11 sets out the general rule that 
all criminal proceedings must take place in the presence of the accused, 
subject to exceptions created by other law. One of these exceptions is 
created in s 158(2). This provides that the court can order a witness to 
testify by means of closed circuit television or similar electronic media. 
The conditions that must exist for such an order to be made are set out in 
s 158(3). First, the facilities must be available or easily obtainable. Then, one 
must consider a list of factors which must all co-exist.12 Such an order must 
prevent unreasonable delay, save costs and be convenient. Furthermore, 
it must either be in the interest of security of state or public safety or in 
the interests of justice or the public; or it must prevent the likelihood that 
prejudice or harm will result to the witness. 
Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act13 deals specifi cally with child 
witnesses,  and provides for the use of an intermediary through whom 
evidence is given where the child witness is under 18 years of age and 
would suffer undue stress or suffering if made to testify in open court.  All 
questioning takes place through the intermediary, including examination, 
re-examination and cross-examination.  At no stage in the proceedings may 
the parties question the witness directly. Only the court may question the 
child directly without going through the intermediary. The intermediary 
is allowed to question the child in more child-appropriate language, 
provided that s/he retains the general purport of the questions asked by 
the parties. Where an intermediary is appointed, the witness is placed in 
another room and does not hear the questions asked by the prosecution 
or defence counsel. The witness may give evidence in an informal setting, 
out of the presence of the accused, provided that the court and the parties 
involved are able to observe the child. This allows for the use of closed 
circuit television or one-way mirrors, thereby enabling the court and 
parties to observe the demeanour of the witness throughout questioning. 
The obvious purpose of this section is to protect a child witness from 
aggressive cross-examination and questioning in legalistic jargon (which 
is often misunderstood by children) as well as the trauma of testifying in 
open court in the presence of the accused.
Problems with the present system regarding child 
witnesses
One of the most often repeated complaints about the present system is its 
adherence to the adversarial system and everything that this brings with 
it, particularly the aggressive cross-examination of the child witness. Just 
about all researchers refer to the brutal cross-examination children have to 
11 51 of 1977.
12 According to S v F 1999 (1) SACR 571(C) all these factors must co-exist.
13 51 of 1977.
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endure at the hands of attorneys and advocates appearing for the accused, 
as a means of apparently getting to the truth of the matter.14
There are four main problems that emerge when considering the present 
position regarding child witnesses in the adversarial system. First, there is 
the problem of secondary victimisation of the child and the trauma and 
stress the child faces when testifying in the ordinary manner. Secondly, it is 
very common for there to be a considerable time delay between the laying 
of charges and the trial. Thirdly, the child is usually subjected to multiple 
interviews before s/he testifi es in court, which can be problematic. Finally, 
there is a low rate of convictions in cases where a child is the main witness 
due to the fact that people are not reporting cases as they are afraid of 
the court process, or because the child breaks down and is unable to give 
evidence.
The problem of secondary victimisation of the child witness is 
considered fi rst. This is the most commonly voiced complaint against 
the present adversarial system when child witnesses are involved.15 It is 
argued that the experience of testifying can be a harmful experience for 
the child due to the fact that s/he will be subjected to examination and 
cross-examination in unfamiliar and possibly frightening surroundings. 
Furthermore, s/he will usually have to re-live the experience in court, 
giving details of terrifying or shameful experiences, which might cause 
embarrassment or may frustrate the healing process that has taken place 
either through therapy or simply through the passing of time. This trauma 
will be exacerbated where the child is required to give such evidence in 
the presence of the accused.16 The object of cross-examining is to show 
that the child is lying, which is why it is often done so aggressively or in 
a manner which is intended to confuse the child or catch him/her out. 
When the examination is conducted by the accused, the effect on the 
child can be even more terrifying.17 
Apart from cross-examination, another factor that may increase the 
trauma suffered by the child is the court room itself. There is extensive 
evidence that the traditional court room and the juxtaposition of the 
14 Op cit (n4) at 11. See for example JJA Key ‘The Child Witness and the Battle for Justice’ 
January 1998 De Rebus 54 in South African Law Commission 28 op cit (n4) at 11-12.
15 Op cit (n4) at 13 where WGM van Zyl, former Regional Court President of Natal, summed 
up the numerous problems that are encountered when dealing with child witnesses in the 
adversarial system.
16 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper 75 ‘The Evidence of Children and Other 
Potentially Vulnerable Witnesses’ (1988) at 21-22.
17 Op cit (n4) at 12. The cross-examiner is not limited by the rule against asking leading 
questions. The child may simply agree with questions put to him/her by the accused for 
fear of punishment if s/he disagrees, especially where the accused is known to the child, 
possibly a family member. See also South African Law Commission op cit (n4) at 14-15 where 
it is noted that research has shown that where the accused is present, the child witness may 
water down his/her evidence against the accused or change it completely merely to escape 
the unpleasant experience.
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presiding offi cer, the accused, the legal representatives of the accused and 
the prosecutor result in the child being afraid, uncertain and confused.18 
Wilson J, in the case of S v Basil Simons,19 stated that he felt it was time 
for consideration to be given to a change in the manner of conducting 
criminal trials arising out of sexual abuse of young children.20
The second problem that arises when dealing with child witnesses is the 
time delay between the laying of charges and the trial. Since trials often 
take place many months, or even years, after an event, many witnesses, 
and perhaps particularly children, may have diffi culty in recalling the 
details of the event with accuracy by the time of the trial.21 Where there 
is a major pre-trial delay there is a serious risk of long-term memory fade. 
This will result in vagueness, confusion and inconsistency in the child’s 
testimony.22 
The third problem encountered is that of multiple interviewing of 
the child. When a child is required to testify in court proceedings many 
months after the alleged event has occurred, s/he will usually have 
undergone several interviews prior to the giving of evidence. These 
could be conducted by doctors, the police, prosecutors, defence lawyers, 
psychologists and possibly members of his/her own family as well. This 
could further increase the trauma suffered by the child.23 But apart from 
that, with each interview there is a risk that the child’s version of events 
may be distorted.24
Finally, it seems as though all the problems attached to the present trial 
procedure are turning people away from the court process and result in 
very few convictions. Many cases of child abuse are either not prosecuted 
at all, or have to be abandoned midway through the proceedings when 
child witnesses break down and are unable to continue. The non-
prosecution or the abandonment of such cases may be due to the fact 
that prosecutors or family members wish to spare children from the stress 
18 Op cit (n4) at 14.
19 Durban and Coast Local Division 1988-06-13 CC 84/88 in South African Law Commission 
op cit (n4) at 14.
20 Op cit (n4) at 14. While he was not suggesting any substantial changes, he said that it 
would be desirable to evolve a system that when a child is called upon to give evidence s/he 
would not be required to do so in a large austere looking court room before judicial offi cers 
sitting on a bench above him/her. Circumstances which are completely strange to the child 
would, he said, cause a great deal of stress and tension. Rather, he suggested, provision 
should be made for a child to testify in circumstances that are not strange to him/her, so that 
s/he is not subjected to more traumatic experiences than are absolutely necessary. He was of 
the opinion that this would be fairer both to the state and the defence.
21 Op cit (n16) at 25.
22 LS McGough Child Witnesses – Fragile Voices in the American Legal System (1994)
191-2.
23 Op cit (n16) at 22.
24 LS McGough op cit (n22) at 192.
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and trauma of testifying.25 It has been argued that many people are opting 
not to prosecute at all just to keep their children out of the courtroom.26 
It is clear that apart from the interests of the child, such consequences are 
clearly not in the public interest or the interests of justice.
The shortcomings of s 170A in addressing these problems
Section 170A has been introduced in order to protect the child witness 
from some of the problems set out above. However, it has been argued 
that this section does not go far enough in attempting to overcome the 
problems encountered when dealing with child witnesses. It is clear 
that the use of an intermediary would counter one of the most apparent 
problems encountered by the child witness in the adversarial system, 
namely the secondary victimisation of and trauma suffered by the child 
witness. The child would be questioned in an informal environment and 
would not be subjected to legalistic, aggressive cross-examination by the 
defence counsel. But what about the other problems? The intermediary 
model does nothing to counter the problem of time delay as it would 
be no different to the ordinary trial procedure in respect of timing. The 
intermediary would be used as a substitute for the ordinary mode of 
examination and cross-examination that would take place during the trial, 
which could be many months after the abuse had occurred. Furthermore, 
the intermediary model does not provide a mechanism that renders it 
unnecessary to conduct several preceding interviews with the child 
witness. Therefore, the problem of multiple interviews is not dealt with.
Section 170A is discretionary and the court may only appoint an 
intermediary when it is apparent that a witness under 18 years will 
be exposed to ‘undue mental stress or suffering if he testifi es at such 
proceedings’. While the discretionary nature of the section is advantageous 
in countering arguments regarding the infringement of the accused’s right 
to challenge evidence, this can in fact be disadvantageous to the child 
witness and can result in many children being unprotected.27  
Section 170A has been subject to various other criticisms for not fully 
addressing the problems encountered by child witnesses. The child is still 
required to re-live the experience when testifying through the intermediary. 
The trial may take place long after the alleged incident, with the result that 
the healing process may be delayed if the child is required to testify (and 
consequently re-live the experience) at the time of the trial.28 The events 
of the incident will not be fresh in the mind of the child, certain details
25 Op cit (n16) at 22.
26 N Seijas The child witness in the adversarial justice system – a proposal for reform 
(1988) in South African Law Commission op cit (n4) at 13.
27 Schwikkard op cit (n7) 159-160.  
28 Schwikkard op cit (n7) 48. 
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may be forgotten and others may have been planted in the child’s mind 
by accidental or deliberate prompting by adults.29 Where the witness is 
extremely young, the intermediary model would not be helpful at all, in 
that the very young may be able to give an account of the incident shortly 
after it occurs, but will be unable to recall or clearly communicate such 
evidence at a later stage.30
It is clear that while the introduction of s 170A goes some way towards 
improving the problems faced by child witnesses, the situation has by no 
means been adequately solved by this section.
Videotaped evidence as a possible solution
Models of videotaped evidence 
It has been suggested that the use of pre-recorded videotaped evidence 
of children could provide a means of protecting children from the 
negative effects of testifying in courts and could also possibly improve the 
chances of getting to the truth of the matter by ensuring a better quality 
of evidence than that achieved in the traditional courtroom setting. There 
are primarily two models of using videotaped evidence which have been 
employed in certain foreign jurisdictions: the recorded statement model 
and the deposition model. 
The recorded statement model
The recorded statement model refers to interviews which take place out 
of the context of criminal proceedings.  They are not authorised or ordered 
by a court but take place naturally in the course of an investigation into 
suspected abuse or other similar suspected crimes.  At the time when such 
an interview occurs there may have been no criminal charges brought 
against anyone. In fact, the primary purpose of the interview may be to 
establish whether criminal offences have been committed at all and, if so, by 
whom.  Alternatively the purpose of the interview may be therapeutic.31 
Generally the interview is conducted by a juvenile social worker 
or a police offi cer and is videotaped. At the outset of the interview the 
interviewer elicits from the child that s/he understands the importance 
of giving an accurate and truthful account.  The only other persons 
present are the camera operator and the child’s parent (or parents) as 
silent observers, there principally for moral support.32 These interviews 
are conducted without the presence of the defendant, defence counsel 
or judge, as often these parties have not been identifi ed at this stage. The 
29 Spencer op cit (n7) 82.
30 Schwikkard op cit (n7) 160.
31 Op cit (n16) at 50.
32 LS McGough op cit (n22) 190.
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videotaped interview could then be introduced at trial in place of live 
testimony from the child. However, the child must be available to testify so 
that the accused can call him/her to the stand after the prosecution rests 
and cross-examine him/her as an adverse witness.33 
The deposition model
With the deposition model, the child’s testimony is elicited by formal 
examination and cross-examination of the child in advance of the trial and 
the process is video-recorded for subsequent presentation at the trial.34 
The deposition therefore takes the place of the child having to testify and 
be cross-examined in court.  This model is similar in certain respects to the 
South African procedure of taking evidence on commission.35 
In terms of this model, the child is interviewed at as early a stage as 
possible by a person skilled in appropriate interviewing techniques.36 The 
interview, which would be video recorded, would take place in a room 
which was of a size, and which was furnished in a manner, likely to put the 
child at ease. During the interview the child might be accompanied by a 
parent or other supportive adult, but the interviewer would be entitled to 
ask that person to leave if that seemed likely to make the child speak more 
freely.37 One wall of the room would be fi tted with a one-way screen and 
the accused and his lawyer would be entitled to view the interview from 
behind that screen. The accused’s lawyer would be able to communicate 
with the interviewer through a microphone and ear speaker so that
33 J O’Brian ‘Television trials and fundamental fairness: The constitutionality of Louisiana’s 
Child Shield Law’ (1986) 61 Tulane LR 145-6 and 168.
34 Op cit (n16) at 100. This model is based upon a possible solution to the problems 
encountered when dealing with child witnesses proposed several times by Professor 
Glanville Williams.
35 A procedure based on the deposition model has been introduced in Scotland.  Section 271 
of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 provides for video evidence on commission 
to be used in criminal trials involving child witnesses. In terms of this procedure, the court 
appoints a lawyer, who acts as the ‘Commissioner’, to take the evidence of the witness. In 
practice, both sides involved in the case will send their lawyers along to question the witness 
in the normal way, with the Commissioner assuming the role of judge. The Act does not 
prohibit the Commissioner from carrying out the questioning him/herself.  The accused is 
not normally permitted to be present but must be able to watch and listen by some means 
while the witness’s evidence is taken, for example by way of a live television link. The 
proceedings are recorded on videotape which can then be played back at trial.  
36 Professor Glanville Williams envisaged that such a person might be a psychiatrist, 
psychologist or a social worker. However, in practice, the interviewer is either a judge or a 
lawyer, not necessarily involved in the case, rather than a person with no legal training.
37 Op cit (n16) at 88-9.
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the interviewer could be asked to put to the child particular questions 
requested by the accused.38 
Advantages and disadvantages in respect of trauma and 
truth seeking
The idea that an acceptable way could be found to put the evidence of 
a child witness before a court without the need for the child to give that 
evidence in person and in formal surroundings is clearly an attractive one. 
This would obviously benefi t young or traumatised children, but could 
also have other advantages.39 There are several compelling reasons for 
trying to fi nd a way in which admissible evidence can be obtained from 
a child at an early stage and in non-threatening surroundings. However, 
any technique designed to achieve that must also respect the rights of 
the accused. The competing interests of the child and the accused are not 
easily reconciled.40 It is therefore necessary to weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two models of pre-recorded videotaped evidence.
Several arguments have been raised as to whether or not the use of pre-
recorded videotaped evidence of a child does in fact improve the quality of 
evidence placed before the court and reduce trauma suffered by the child 
witness. A general argument against the use of pre-recorded videotaped 
evidence (whatever model is employed) is that it is an unfair procedure 
as it is possible that the children’s testimony was extracted by leading 
questions or other unfair interviewing techniques. This argument fails to 
recognise that interviews can be conducted fairly as well as unfairly, and 
that interviewers can be trained to interview fairly and effectively.  The 
fact that it is possible to conduct a bad interview is no reason for a rule 
which requires us to reject a good one.41
It has been argued that there is a risk that videotapes distort the impact 
of the evidence.  According to some critics, juries tend to give videotaped 
evidence too much weight because of an effect called ‘status enhancement’. 
However, on the other hand, juries tend to give such evidence too little 
38 Op cit (n16) at 89. Professor Williams’s proposal envisages that, in some cases, an interview 
of the kind which he suggests may take place even before an accused has been arrested 
and charged. In such a case, the accused would, following arrest and charge, be entitled to 
see the recording of the earlier interview and would then be entitled to request a second 
interview so that questions by him might be put to the child.  This is not in fact the general 
practice in jurisdictions that make use of the deposition model.  The reason for this is that it 
could create confusion between the investigation of the crime and the securing of testimony 
which can at a later stage be used in place of testimony in court.  It would in fact result in the 
procedure being more similar to the recorded statement model, where the interview often 
occurs before the accused has been arrested and charged.
39 Op cit (n16) at 87.
40 Op cit (n16) at 88.
41 JR Spencer and RH Flin The Evidence of children: The law and psychology (1993) 
191-2.
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weight because it seems unreal to them. Whether or not either of these 
arguments are true, they are not particularly strong objections if it would 
not be feasible to get the child in question to give live evidence, and the 
choice is between hearing the child on videotape or not hearing the 
child at all.42 Furthermore, in South Africa where we no longer have a jury 
system, such an argument seems to be obsolete. 
The recorded statement model
Looking specifi cally at the recorded statement model, there are several 
advantages of using this model as a means of securing the evidence of 
children. Firstly, it enables the court to hear what the child was saying 
about the incident at the time it fi rst came to light.  This would guard 
against the problems of memory-fade or distortion, which occur due to 
multiple interviewing of the child and the passing of time. As well as telling 
us exactly what the child said, an early tape would tell us how s/he said it. 
In the course of being questioned, children often pick up the adult words 
for sexual acts.  They then use these when giving evidence in court, which 
often leads to the suggestion that they have been coached.43
A tape of an early interview will tell us how the child was questioned 
as well as what the answers were.  Early interviews may have been 
conducted in such a way as to put answers in the child’s mouth, which are 
then incorporated into the child’s later testimony. A videotape of an early 
interview would reveal whether or not this had occurred. Conversely, 
when a child eventually comes to court under present conditions, it is 
likely that s/he will have been asked the same questions several times by a 
number of different people, with the result that the evidence in court may 
be given in a dull parrot-like way, creating the false impression that the 
child has been coached. Seeing an early interview on tape would correct 
this impression.44
A suspect can be shown a videotape of an interview with a child 
witness in the course of an investigation, when s/he cannot so easily be 
confronted with the child him/herself. If s/he is innocent, an early sight of 
the videotape gives him/her an earlier and better opportunity to contest 
the accusations and produce counter-evidence than s/he has under the 
present rules governing advance disclosure of the prosecution case. If 
s/he is guilty, on the other hand, seeing the videotape may precipitate an 
admission, probably followed by a plea of guilty.45
If a videotape of an early interview can be used in evidence, this can 
supplement the evidence of a child who is inarticulate or forgetful at 
42 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 194.
43 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 196.
44 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 197. 
45 Ibid.
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the trial. If a child is questioned in relaxed surroundings, this is likely to 
produce a fuller story than the child is able to tell in open court.46
An argument that has been raised against this model is that videotapes 
may preserve a series of interviews in the course of which the child told 
confl icting stories. This could make a prosecution harder where the only 
evidence is a live child in the witness stand. However, while this may 
be true, if a child has told contradictory stories during the investigation 
surely this is information that the court should know? Although it might 
be a drawback as far as the prosecution is concerned, it is clearly in the 
interests of justice for such information to come to light.47 
It has been said that this process might have the effect of lengthening 
criminal trials. If there is a videotape of the child’s early statements as well 
as live evidence from the child, the process will possibly take longer, and 
in the case of a young child particularly, it is possible that the interview 
may be considerably longer than the child’s evidence in court. However, it 
should not matter that contested cases take longer if the greater availability 
of videotaped evidence result in a larger proportion of guilty pleas or 
convictions. Such an argument is a weak one if the reason that the trial 
takes longer is that more useful information is put before the court and 
that information is reliable and useful.48
Although this model holds clear advantages for justice and obtaining the 
best evidence, it does not actually benefi t the child in any real way, apart 
from the fact that it may result in a greater number of convictions. The 
child is still required to suffer the trauma and anxiety of giving evidence at 
trial, as well as the stress of waiting for the trial. Furthermore, it is possible 
that such a procedure could result in cross-examination being even more 
stressful for the child as the defence would be able to question him/her 
on the videotape as well.
The deposition model
The deposition model shares most of the advantages of the recorded 
statement model, apart from the fact that it is not made as soon after the 
incident occurs. However, a deposition would still take place much sooner 
after the incident comes to light than the actual trial would occur, and 
would also therefore effectively deal with the problems of memory fade 
and distortion that occur over time.
One of the greatest attractions of this model is that it does go a signifi cant 
way to reducing the trauma and stress suffered by child witnesses. The 
tape of the deposition is shown as a substitute for producing the child 
in court. The child therefore doesn’t have to face the accused or undergo 
46 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 198.
47 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 193-4.
48 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 195.
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aggressive cross-examination at the hands of the defence in a formal and 
intimidating courtroom. Furthermore, the child is able to deal with the 
offence and obtain therapy or be encouraged to forget the details soon 
after it occurs, without having to wait for months before coming to court 
where s/he will have to relive the experience.
Another advantage of this procedure is that it is possible to examine 
a video deposition of a child telling a story much more closely than it 
is possible to study a child giving live evidence in a witness box. A tape 
can be replayed, or made to pause while a particular detail or nuance is 
carefully studied. This is obviously impossible when dealing with a live 
witness.49 
The deposition model offers a practical means of putting before the 
court the evidence of a very young or highly traumatised child, which 
the court would otherwise be unable to hear at all. At present, if a child 
is abused, a combination of the competency assessment, the hearsay rule 
and the rigours of open court often ensure that a court is forced to decide 
a case without hearing the child’s version of events, even where the child 
was the only witness to the offence.50
There are a few problems that have been raised with the deposition 
model. Firstly, the deposition would take place at a later stage than the 
recorded statement model. However, as mentioned above, it would still 
occur considerably sooner than the actual trial. Another argument is that 
the procedure is more formal and adversarial in nature and this could 
possibly result in the child not giving as accurate an account as possible. 
It has been said that ‘children are more accurate witnesses when their 
memories are skilfully elicited in a non-adversarial mode’.51 Although this 
is undoubtedly true, the possible reason for the use of a slightly more 
formal procedure is to deal with the problem of prejudice to the accused 
and his/her right to a fair trial. Furthermore, the process is still far less 
formal and adversarial in nature than the traditional trial procedure.
Barriers to the use of videotaped evidence
According to the case of S v Baleka,52 videotaped evidence is admissible 
as real evidence in South Africa. Therefore, all that needs to be established 
in order for a videotape to be admitted is that the evidence has probative 
value. Once it has been admitted the court will look at other factors to 
determine what weight should be attached to it.53 However, there have been 
several judgments by the Natal Provincial Division that treat videotaped 
49 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 199.
50 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 200.
51 McGough op cit (n22) 227.
52 1986 (4) SA 1005 (T).
53 Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe op cit (n6) 257.
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evidence as documentary evidence.54 Because of this it must be established 
that what is presented to the court is the original recording and it must be 
identifi ed by the person who made it. It must also be established that there 
is no reasonable possibility of interference with the videotape.55 
Despite the fact that there seems to be some confusion in our law 
whether videotaped evidence is real or documentary evidence, this 
should not be problematic for the admission of pre-recorded videotaped 
evidence, in either the recorded-statement form or the deposition form. If 
such evidence is to be regarded as documentary evidence, there will be 
certain requirements that will need to be fulfi lled in order for the evidence 
to be admitted, but these are not particularly onerous requirements in 
the circumstances. Furthermore, it seems likely that in any event such 
evidence will be treated as real evidence, in line with S v Baleka.56
As the issue of real or documentary evidence does not seem to be a 
problem, there are two main grounds upon which the admissibility 
of videotaped evidence can be challenged.  First, there is a possibility 
that such evidence would fall foul of the rule against hearsay evidence. 
Secondly, it is possible that such evidence would infringe the right to a fair 
trial, in particular the right to adduce and challenge evidence.
Hearsay
According to s 3(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,57 hearsay is 
defi ned as ‘evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of 
which depends on the credibility of any person other than the person 
giving such evidence’.
There are various explanations for the rule against hearsay, but the best 
reason seems to be that it is unreliable as there is no opportunity for cross-
examination.  As with the rule that evidence must be given orally, this 
refl ects the belief that the adversarial system is the best method to get to 
the truth. The purpose of cross-examination is to challenge the witness 
and thereby show that s/he is untruthful or mistaken. It also attempts to 
elicit points that are favourable to the cross-examiner’s case. With hearsay 
evidence, this testing of evidence is not possible.58
Although there is a general rule against hearsay evidence, the court has 
now been given a discretion to admit such evidence in terms of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act.59 According to s 3 of the Act, hearsay as defi ned 
in s 3(4) is inadmissible unless certain requirements are met. Hearsay may 
be admitted by agreement or where the person upon whose credibility 
54 S v Ramgobin 1986 (4) SA 117 (N); S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 330 (N).
55 Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe op cit (n6) 256-7.
56 S v Baleka supra (n52).
57 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.
58 Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe op cit (n6) 156.
59 45 of 1988.
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the probative value of such evidence depends him/herself testifi es at such 
proceedings.60 Section 3(1)(c) confers a discretion on the court to admit 
hearsay evidence in the interests of justice. In doing so it must take into 
account the nature of proceedings, the nature of the evidence, the purpose 
for which the evidence is tendered, the probative value of the evidence, 
the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, any prejudice 
to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail and, fi nally, 
any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into 
account.61 The court therefore has to engage in a weighing up of all the 
circumstances in each case and is given what could be called a guided 
discretion to admit hearsay evidence.62
The hearsay objection to the use of videotapes is a very weak one because 
several exceptions have already been made to it in the interests of justice. 
The hearsay rule is defensible in so far as it forbids the use of a second-
hand account of an incident when a more reliable fi rst-hand account is 
available. But in so far as it prevents second-hand accounts being given 
when they are likely to be more reliable than fi rst-hand accounts, or when 
no fi rst-hand account is available, the hearsay rule seems irrational and 
there can be no reason for refusing to make an exception to it.63 One of 
the main reasons for the rule against hearsay is the risk that the declarant 
never actually said what the person giving the hearsay proposes to tell the 
court that s/he said. However, where there is a videotape of the declarant 
making the statement, which enables us to see and hear him/her in the 
very act of saying it, such a risk no longer seems to exist.64
According to s 3(1)(b) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,65 hearsay 
evidence will be admitted where ‘the person upon whose credibility 
the probative value of such evidence depends, himself testifi es at such 
proceedings’.  Therefore, the recorded statement model would not infringe 
the hearsay rule as the child is required to testify at trial. 
The deposition model might, however, be problematic in this respect 
as the child does not have to attend court proceedings at all during the 
trial. The videotaped deposition completely replaces the presence of the 
child at trial. In order to determine whether such evidence would be 
admissible, one needs to examine the factors which are set out by the Act 
in s 3(1)(c). The essence of this section is that hearsay evidence will be 
inadmissible unless the interests of justice require that it is admitted. The 
factors that are laid out simply guide the court in deciding whether or 
60 Section 3(1)(b).
61 Section 3(1)(c). 
62 Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe op cit (n6) 159.
63 Spencer op cit (n7) 80.
64 Spencer and Flin op cit (n41) 173.
65 Act 45 of 1998.
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not it would be in the interests of justice to admit such evidence. In light 
of the above discussion and all the benefi ts of videotaped depositions, a 
strong argument could be made that it would be in the interests of justice 
to admit such evidence. 
A case that may be useful in dealing with this issue is the judgement 
of S v Ndhlovo.66  In this case Cameron J dealt with the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence and the argument that the hearsay provisions of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act67 are unconstitutional as they infringe the 
constitutional right to challenge evidence. It is true that the admission 
of hearsay evidence by defi nition denies an accused the right to cross-
examine, since the declarant is not in court and cannot be cross-examined. 
However, Cameron J could not accept that the use of hearsay evidence by 
the state violates the accused’s right to challenge evidence, if it is meant 
that the inability to cross-examine the source of a statement in itself 
violates the right to challenge evidence. He goes on to say that the Bill 
of Rights does not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to 
cross-examination, but rather the right to challenge evidence. Where that 
evidence is hearsay, the right entails that the accused can challenge its 
admissibility and scrutinise its probative value, including its reliability. But 
where the interests of justice require that hearsay evidence be admitted, 
no constitutional right is infringed.  Put differently, where the interests 
of justice require that the hearsay statement be admitted, the right to 
‘challenge evidence’ does not encompass the right to cross-examine the 
original declarant.68
Constitutional barriers
The above principles regarding oral evidence and hearsay refl ect our 
adherence to the adversarial system as a means of discovering the truth. 
A further instance where this idea manifests itself, which is linked to the 
above two principles, is an accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and 
to face-to-face confrontation with witnesses. These rights could be seen 
as acquiring constitutional status by virtue of s 35(3) of the Constitution, 
which provides for the broad right to a fair trial and in particular the right 
to challenge evidence.  However, the implication of S v Ndhlovu69 is that 
this is not so and that cross-examination is not the only way of fulfi lling the 
right to challenge evidence.  
Nevertheless, as the right to cross-examination is the traditionally 
accepted way of guaranteeing the right to challenge evidence, it is useful
66 2002 (6) SA 305 SCA.
67 45 of 1998.
68 At para 24.
69 S v Ndhlovo supra (n66).
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to consider what inroads the use of videotaped evidence might make on 
cross-examination.70 
According to the traditional approach, the right to challenge evidence 
includes:
‘the right to have the fullest opportunity of cross-examining meaningfully and 
effectively. Where the cross-examiner’s questions are substituted by another 
person and the examination does not take place within the physical presence 
of the examiner, there is a prima facie limitation of the right when given its 
broadest adversarial meaning.’71 
This clearly has implications for videotaped evidence. However, in light of 
S v Ndhlovu,72 it does not seem that this position is as entrenched as was 
previously thought.
The recorded statement model seems to present less of a restriction on 
the accused’s ability to cross-examine because according to this model the 
child must be available to testify at trial and can be cross-examined by the 
defence in the normal way.  The only possible objection is that the accused 
is prejudiced due to the fact that s/he could not cross-examine the child 
at the time the recorded statement was actually made. However, it does 
not actually seem likely that the accused will suffer any prejudice due to 
delayed cross-examination of the child and therefore this cannot be seen 
as making signifi cant inroads on the accused’s ability to cross-examine.73 
The deposition model would possibly be more problematic when dealing 
with the accused’s ability to cross-examine the child. The accused does 
have the opportunity to cross-examine the child at the time the deposition 
occurs, but his/her questioning will take place through some kind of 
intermediary.  This use of an intermediary, which prevents the accused from 
face-to-face confrontation and might change the wording of the accused’s 
questions, could constitute a curtailment of cross-examination. In terms of 
the traditional approach, such a procedure would be regarded as a prima 
facie infringement of the accused’s right to challenge evidence. However, 
in light of Ndhlovu, it must be recognised that cross-examination is not 
an essential component of the right to challenge evidence. Therefore, one 
needs to consider whether despite this restricted cross-examination, the 
accused has adequate opportunity to challenge the evidence.
The issue here would essentially be the same as with the use of 
intermediaries under s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act.74 While it is 
not the intention of this article to examine the intermediary procedure in 
70 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) 346. In the American case of Douglas 
v Alabama 380 US 415 (1965), the court held that the primary interest of the confrontation 
clause in the Sixth Amendment is the right of cross-examination.
71 Steytler op cit (n70) 348.
72 S v Ndhlovo supra (n66).
73 Schwikkard ‘The abused child:  A few rules of evidence considered’ op cit (n7) 161-2.
74 51 of 1997.
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any great detail as this is an area that has been extensively researched, it 
should be noted that the courts, particularly the High Courts, have seemed 
rather reluctant to apply this section, due to the fear of prejudice to the 
accused.75 
In the case of Klink v Regional Magistrate NO76 the court dealt with 
the constitutionality of s 170A. The court examined the problem of 
secondary victimisation of child witnesses and found that the ordinary 
procedures of the criminal justice system were inadequate to address the 
needs of child witnesses. The court held that the fi ltering of questions 
through an intermediary did not limit the right to cross-examine, as the 
intermediary was acting as an ‘interpreter’.77 The fact that the forcefulness 
and full benefi ts of cross-examination were denied in the circumstances 
was explained by balancing the rights of the accused against the rights 
of the child.78 Furthermore, it was held that the court’s control over the 
process ensured that the questions retained their integrity.79 Finally, the 
court focussed on the importance of the truth-seeking function of the 
court and came to the conclusion that the accused’s right has not been 
violated and therefore there was no need for a limitations analysis.
If it were to be held that the right to challenge evidence is infringed 
by the use of videotaped evidence, an important factor to be taken into 
account in determining whether the requirements of the limitations clause 
are met would be s 28(1)(d) and (i) of the Constitution.80 
Safeguards provided in other jurisdictions
If videotaped evidence were to be admitted, it would need to be ensured 
that suffi cient safeguards exist to protect the accused’s right to challenge 
evidence. In this regard, it is helpful to look at the mechanisms provided 
in other jurisdictions that make use of videotaped evidence of child 
witnesses.
In the United Kingdom, Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 makes a number of measures available to help witnesses who 
might otherwise have diffi culty giving evidence in criminal proceedings 
or who might be reluctant to do so, including the use of both models of 
75 S v Nkabinde 1998 (8) BCLR 996 (N) at 1001B-E, where the court focussed on the right 
to confront one’s accusers as being integral to the adversarial system, and praised this system. 
S v Stefaans 1999 (1) SACR 182 (C) where it was held that s170A made inroads into the right 
to challenge evidence and decreed that this be borne in mind when dealing with this section 
and S v F 1999 (1) SACR 571(C) where it was pointed out that the procedure encroached 
upon an accused’s rights.
76 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE).
77 Klink v Regional Magistrate NO supra (n76) at 411.
78 Klink v Regional Magistrate NO supra (n76) at 412.
79 Klink v Regional Magistrate NO supra (n76) at 412-3.
80 Steytler op cit (n70) 349.
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videotaped testimony. In terms of this Act, it is possible for a pre-recorded 
videotaped interview to be admitted as the child’s evidence-in-chief, in 
which case the child will be required to appear in court to be cross-
examined.81 Provision is also made for such cross-examination to take 
place while the evidence-in-chief is being recorded and to be recorded 
and viewed at trial, in which case the child will not have to appear in court 
for cross-examination.82
Various safeguards have been included in the Act in order to ensure that 
the accused’s right to challenge evidence is protected. First, only certain 
categories of people are eligible to apply for special measures to help them 
give evidence in court and, in determining whether a witness falls into 
any of these categories, the courts must also determine whether making 
such measures available to an eligible witness will be likely to improve 
the quality of evidence.83 Furthermore, video-recordings may be excluded 
and edited if the interests of justice so require. In deciding whether to 
allow only an edited recording to be used in evidence, courts will have 
to consider whether the parts sought to be excluded are so prejudicial 
as to outweigh the desirability of using the whole recording.84 Where a 
direction has been made for a recording to be shown to the court, the 
court can later exclude the recording if there is not enough information 
available about how and where the recording was made or if the witness 
who made the recording is not available for further questioning (whether 
by video, in court or by live link) and the parties to the case have not 
agreed that this is unnecessary. However, courts will retain the discretion 
to admit the recordings in these circumstances.85
Although the videotaped interview and cross-examination will form the 
whole of the witness’s testimony, there may be circumstances in which the 
court can give permission for the witness to be asked further questions 
about matters not covered adequately in the videotaped interview or 
cross-examination. Courts are allowed to give such permission on their 
own initiative or on an application by one of the parties to the case, if that 
party can show that there has been a material change in the circumstances 
or if it is in the interests of justice to do so.86
In Canada s 715.1 of the Criminal Code, introduced in 1988 in the Bill 
C-15 reform and subsequently amended to extend its coverage, provides for 
the admissibility of videotaped statements made by child witnesses who 
were under the age of 18 years at the time the offence was committed.  The 
81 Section 27 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
82 Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
83 Section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. See also explanatory 
notes to this Act at para 21.
84 Subsections 27(2) and (3) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
85 Subsection 27(4) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
86 Subsections 27(5)(b), 27(7), 28(5) and 28(6) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999.
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videotape must have been made within a reasonable time after the offence 
and the child witness must adopt the contents of the videotape at trial.87
The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld the constitutionality of this 
provision in the case of R v F.88 The court held that s 715.1 has built-in 
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability.89 First, there is the requirement 
that the statement must be made within a reasonable time. Secondly, the 
trier of fact can watch the entire interview, which provides an opportunity 
to observe the demeanour and to assess the personality and intelligence 
of the child. Thirdly, there is the requirement that the child attest that 
s/he was attempting to be truthful at the time the statement was made. 
Furthermore, the child can be cross examined at trial as to whether s/he 
was actually being truthful when the statement was made. In this way, the 
Court held that there were suffi cient safeguards to ensure the reliability of 
the pre-recorded videotaped evidence.90 
In the United States 33 states have introduced new legislation authorising, 
in certain circumstances, a pre-trial videotaped deposition in cases dealing 
with child witnesses. However, there are many differences between the 
various statutes. In some cases the statutes permit the accused to be 
present and in full view of the child while the deposition is being taken. In 
others, the court may exclude the accused from the deposition room but 
must permit him to hear and observe the child, possibly via closed circuit 
television or a one-way screen.91  The statutes also differ as to whether or 
not the child will have to give evidence in court at the subsequent trial. 
It has been observed that although pre-trial depositions could be regarded 
as hearsay, most American statutes regard them as the functional equiva-
lent of testimony at trial. There have, however, been several challenges to 
the constitutionality of the deposition statutes on the grounds that they 
infringe the accused’s right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is interesting to note 
that in some cases the courts have upheld the constitutionality of statutes 
which preserve a right of cross-examination, albeit that the accused is 
excluded from the room where the deposition is being taken.92
As mentioned above, according to the Sixth Amendment, criminal 
defendants are given the right of confrontation. This right has generally 
been interpreted as requiring face-to-face, physical confrontation. However, 
it has also been interpreted more broadly as affording a criminal defendant
87 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s 715.1.
88 R v F (C.C.) (1997) 3 S.C.R 1183.
89 R v F supra (n88) at para 40.
90 R v F supra (n88) at para 44. 
91 Op cit (n16) at 44-45.
92 S v Johnson 729 P 2d 1169 (Kan 1986); S v Cooper 353 SE 2d 451 (SC 1987), as cited in 
Scottish Law Commission op cit (n16) at 46-47.
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the right of cross-examination and, as such, has served as a constitutional 
limitation on the use of hearsay evidence.93
The rules against admission of hearsay evidence stem from a long line 
of Supreme Court cases establishing that cross-examination is the best 
mechanism for discovering the truth and that the most reliable statements 
come from the witness stand. However, there are several exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.  There are two main reasons for allowing such exceptions. 
First, sometimes the reliability of certain hearsay statements can be 
assured without cross-examination of the original declarant. Secondly, it 
is sometimes necessary to admit hearsay evidence in cases where the 
original declarant is unavailable or dead.94
Pre-recorded videotaped statements are of course hearsay and there 
have been several Supreme Court cases dealing with the admissibility of 
such evidence. In the case of Pointer v Texas,95 the Supreme Court held 
that preliminary hearing testimony could not be received at trial due to 
the confrontation clause. There was no opportunity for the defendant to 
cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing and therefore he 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. In a similar case, 
Douglas v Alabama,96 the Supreme Court again held that the inability 
of an accused to cross-examine a witness whose prior testimony the 
prosecution sought to introduce denied him the right of confrontation.97
Following Pointer, the court decided a series of cases fi nding violations 
of the confrontation clause where the defendant was unable to effectively 
cross-examine the witness. These cases illustrate that the purpose of the 
confrontation clause, like that of the hearsay rule, is seen to be to preserve 
the right of cross-examination. However, the court then decided the case 
of California v Green,98 which is more favourable to the admission of 
videotaped evidence. The court said that the confrontation clause does 
not require excluding from evidence the prior statements of a witness 
who concedes making the statements, and who may be asked to defend 
the statement, thus opening him/herself up to full cross-examination 
at trial.99 Although this case seems to allow for the admission of pre-
recorded videotaped evidence, there were certain conditions upon which 
the decision was based. First, the foundation for the allowance of prior 
testimony at trial was the court’s belief that the witness is available at trial 
and will be subject to full, face-to-face cross-examination. Furthermore, 
the declarant was unavailable to give testimony when called to the stand 
93 J O’Brian op cit (n33) 168.
94 J O’Brian op cit (n33) 169-170.
95 380 US 400 (1965).
96 380 US 415 (1965).
97 J O’Brian op cit (n33) 170.
98 399 US 149 (1970).
99 Confi rmed in Crawford v Washington 541 US 36 (2004) at 24.
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during the trial, due to a lapse in memory. Finally, because the hearsay 
statement was from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had 
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the hearsay had suffi cient 
indicia of reliability.100 In the case of Tolbert v State,101 a Texas appellate 
court cited the case of California v Green and noted that the Sixth 
Amendment was satisfi ed if the witness is subjected to full and effective 
cross-examination.
Approach taken by the South African Law Commission
In 1991, the South African Law Commission dealt with the issue of pre-
recorded videotaped evidence of child witnesses in its Report on the 
Protection of Child Witnesses.102 In this report, the South African Law 
Commission referred to its working paper in which it had stated that the 
recording of a child’s initial statement on video may be of much practical 
use to both the police and prosecutor, but that according to current rules 
of law such a recording would not carry any weight.103 However, after 
receiving various comments on this matter, the commission amended its 
position and stated in its report that video recordings can in fact be proved 
to be admissible evidence.104 The commission’s initial opinion was not to 
recommend the admissibility of video recordings without reservations.105 
The commission stated in its report that in view of the fact that video 
recordings can be admissible evidence in court according to the existing 
rules of law, it was of the opinion that this proposal did not require any 
further statutory amendments. It expressed that video recordings do 
indeed have several advantages, but the commission’s view as expressed 
in the report was that their use is a matter for the police.106
The issue of pre-recorded videotaped testimony was revisited by the 
South African Law Commission in respect of Project 107 on Sexual 
Offences. In its discussion paper,107 the commission examined the various 
arguments that have been raised for and against the use of videotaped 
testimony of child abuse victims.108 While the commission acknowledged 
the benefi ts of allowing such a procedure, in the end it was not convinced 
that current circumstances allow for the introduction of pre-recorded 
100 J O’Brian op cit (n33) 172-4.  
101 697 S.W. 2d 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
102 South African Law Commission (Project 71) Report on the protection of child witnesses 
(February 1991).
103 Op cit (n102) at 62.
104 Op cit (n102) at 62-63.
105 Op cit (n102) at 64.
106  Op cit (n102) at 64.
107 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) Sexual Offences: 
Process and Procedure Volume 3 (2001).
108 Op cit (n107) chp 25.
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videotaped testimony as evidence during the trial.109 One of the main 
issues seemed to be that of resources.  It was felt that South Africa does not 
have the personnel resources with the necessary skills for the commission 
to be confi dent that videotaped interviews will be of a suffi ciently high 
standard.110 The other main reason for not recommending the use of 
videotaped testimony was that the commission felt that such a procedure 
would not actually effectively avoid the problem of exposing the child 
witness to the court process as, in all likelihood, such witnesses would 
still have to be cross-examined.111 The commission was of the opinion that 
given the other protective measures suggested in the discussion paper, 
and the lack of interviewing skills, videotaped evidence would not protect 
victims in South Africa.112 However, the commission did state that it felt that 
the subject of videotaping of evidence should be an investigation on its 
own with extensive consultation on the development of a memorandum 
to guide interviewers.113
In its Sexual Offences Report of December 2002, the commission came 
to the conclusion that videotaped evidence is an extremely complex issue 
which is deserving of more detailed research.114
Conclusion
It is clear from the above examination that the use of pre-recorded 
videotaped evidence holds several advantages for dealing with child 
witness in the criminal justice system.  Apart from helping to alleviate the 
inevitable trauma suffered by children who come into contact with the 
justice system, this procedure may in fact hold advantages for justice and 
getting to the truth of the matter by obtaining the best evidence possible. 
Other jurisdictions have been persuaded of the good sense of admitting 
such evidence, given that satisfactory safeguards may be put in place.
Although such a procedure, on the face of it, seems to run contrary to 
the traditions of orality and the rules against hearsay, which are prioritised 
in our adversarial system, it seems that such issues may be successfully 
overcome. In light of the judgment in S v Ndhlovu,115 where it was 
held that the constitutional right to challenge evidence does not in fact 
include the right to face-to-face cross-examination, it seems as though the 
constitutional argument against such a procedure could be overcome, 
provided the necessary safeguards are in place in order to protect the 
109 Op cit (n107) at 400.
110 Op cit (n107) at 399.
111 Op cit (n107) at 400.
112 Op cit (n107) at 400-401.
113 Op cit (n107) at 400.
114 South African Law Commission (Project 107) Sexual Offences Report (December 2002) 
at 118.
115 S v Ndhlovo supra (n66).
       
rights of the accused. However, even if it were to be found that such a 
procedure would infringe the accused’s right to challenge evidence, it is 
probable that such a limitation would be justifi able in terms of a limitations 
analysis under s 36 of the Constitution116.  
It seems that the main problem attendant on this procedure is one of 
implementation and lack of resources. It is clear that the South African Law 
Commission does not think that there are available resources at this time to 
implement this procedure. However, the door has not been closed on this 
issue as the South African Law Commission has stated that there should 
be further research and investigation into the use of videotaped evidence. 
While it appears that our courts do have the technological resources to 
effectively implement such a procedure, a major concern is that there is 
a lack of skilled personnel who are effectively equipped to implement 
the procedure. However, we need to ask ourselves whether this is a good 
enough argument against allowing a procedure that could potentially 
hold such signifi cant benefi ts. It seems as though what would be needed 
in order to implement this system would be the training of personnel 
as skilled interviewers. Such skilled interviewers should be available in 
any event in order to act as intermediaries under s 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act117 and therefore it should not present too great a cost to 
train extra personnel in this way.  Therefore, the costs of implementing 
this system seem to be clearly outweighed by the benefi ts and it appears 
that implementation would not in fact place too great a burden on the 
criminal justice system.
116 Act 108 of 1996.
117 51 of 1977.
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